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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-5611 
 
FRANK T. MILLER, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 
DONALD E. LEWIS, WARDEN/ADMINISTRATOR; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-2844) 
 
Submitted by the Clerk for a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253 
Jan. 8, 1998 
 
Before: BECKER,* NYGAARD, and ROTH, 
Circuit Judges. 
(MOTIONS PANEL A) 
 
(Filed: May 26, 1998) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Third Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
  
       FRANK T. MILLER #58406 
       Riverfront State Prison 
       P.O. Box 9104 
       Camden, NJ 08101 
 
        Pro se 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal of the district court's denial of Miller's motion 
for an extension of time to file a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, submitted as an application for a certificate of 
appealability, 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1), presents the question 
whether the period of limitation set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
S 2244(d)(1) is subject to equitable tolling. We conclude that 
it is, and thus we will grant the certificate of appealability, 
vacate the order of the district court dismissing Miller's 
motion, and remand for further consideration. 
 
I. 
 
In 1994, the New Jersey Department of Corrections found 
inmate Frank Miller guilty of conspiring to introduce 
narcotics into prison. Miller appealed the administrative 
decision through the state courts. The New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the Department of 
Corrections, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied 
Miller's petition for certification. Miller then moved in the 
district court for an extension of time to file a habeas 
petition. The district court denied the motion,finding that 
it was filed more than one year after the one year limitation 
period of S 2244(d)(1) became effective under the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), and thus was untimely. Miller filed a timely 
appeal which we construe as a request for a certificate of 
appealability pursuant to S 2253(c)(1). 
 
II. 
 
Section 2244(d)(1) provides: 
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       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 
 
       (A) the date on which the judgment became final by 
       the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 
       time for seeking such review; 
 
       (B) the date on which the impediment to filing a n 
       application created by State action in violation of the 
       Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 
       the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 
       action; 
 
       (C) the date on which the constitutional right 
       asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, 
       if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
       Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
       collateral review; or 
 
       (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the 
       claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
       through the exercise of due diligence. 
 
Miller's conviction became final in June, 1995, when the 
New Jersey Supreme Court denied his petition for 
certification. Because this was prior to April 24, 1996, the 
effective date of AEDPA, Miller had until April 23, 1997 to 
file his S 2254 petition. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 
111 (3d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the district court properly 
found that Miller's motion for an extension of time to file a 
S 2254 petition, filed on June 4, 1997, was not filed within 
the requisite time period. 
 
Miller argues, however, that this time period should be 
equitably tolled. He claims that he was delayed infiling his 
petition because he was in transit between various 
institutions and did not have access to his legal documents 
until April 2, 1997, and because he did not learn of the new 
limitation period until April 10, 1997. The Ninth Circuit, 
the only court of appeals to address the issue, held that 
S 2244(d)(1) is a statute of limitations subject to equitable 
tolling. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 
1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 
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(1998). Judge Kozinski's strong opinion in Calderon has 
been adopted by Parker v. Bowersox, 975 F. Supp. 1251, 
1252 (W.D. Mo. 1997) and United States v. Gould, No. 
97-3090, 1997 WL 535821 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1997). For the 
following reasons, we agree with Calderon. 
 
III. 
 
Time limitations analogous to a statue of limitations are 
subject to equitable modifications such as tolling, see 
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1387 (3d Cir. 1994), which "stops the running of the 
statute of limitations in light of established equitable 
considerations," New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS 
Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1125 (3d Cir. 1997). On the other 
hand, when a time limitation is considered jurisdictional, it 
cannot be modified and non-compliance is an absolute bar. 
See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. In determining whether a 
specific time limitation should be viewed as a statute of 
limitations or a jurisdictional bar, we look to congressional 
intent by considering the language of the statute, legislative 
history, and statutory purpose. See Shendock v. Director, 
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 
1462-64 (3d Cir. 1990) (in banc). 
 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, the language of AEDPA 
clearly indicates that the one year period is a statute of 
limitations and not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon, 128 
F.3d at 1288. First, S 2244(d)(1) refers to the one year as a 
"period of limitation" and a "limitation period", and does not 
use the term "jurisdiction". See Shendock, 893 F.2d at 1462 
(giving "considerable weight" to Congress' use of term 
"jurisdiction" in filing provision). Moreover, the statute 
affirmatively separates the time limitation provision from 
the section that deals with jurisdiction. Section 2244(d)(1), 
the limitation provision, only speaks in terms of a one year 
filing period and does not purport to limit the jurisdiction 
of the district courts in any way. Similarly, S 2241, the 
provision in which Congress explictly grants jurisdiction to 
the district courts, does not reference the timelyfiling 
requirement. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982) (considering the absence of any 
reference to jurisdiction in Title VII filing requirement 
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provision and the absence of any reference to timelyfiling 
in jurisdiction provision). 
 
Furthermore, S 2244(d)(1) contains "its own version of a 
`discovery rule' in paragraph [D], and a provision similar to 
the common law rule of fraudulent concealment in 
paragraph [B], suggest[ing] that the drafters envisioned the 
provision to function as a typical statute of limitations, 
rather than a jurisdictional limitation." Gould, 1997 WL 
535821, at *3. 
 
The legislative history reinforces this conclusion. The 
congressional conference report does not refer to 
jurisdiction, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, and statements 
by various members of Congress refer to the period as a 
statute of limitations, see, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S3472 (daily 
ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("I introduced 
legislation . . . to impose a statute of limitations on the filing 
of habeas corpus petitions"); 142 Cong. Rec. H3606 (daily 
ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("Now, we have 
a 1-year statute of limitations in habeas."); 141 Cong. Rec. 
S7597 (daily ed. May 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(the bill will "have 1-year statute of limitations"). 
 
Such an interpretation is also consistent with the 
statutory purpose of AEDPA. The statute was enacted, in 
relevant part, to curb the abuse of the writ of habeas 
corpus. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944. ConstruingS 2244(d)(1) 
as a statute of limitation clearly serves this purpose. It 
provides a one year limitation period that will considerably 
speed up the habeas process while retaining judicial 
discretion to equitably toll in extraordinary circumstances. 
We add that this interpretation is also consistent with the 
construction we gave to S 2244(d)(1) in Burns, 134 F.3d at 
111-13 (holding that (1) S 2244(d)(1) does n ot bar petitions 
filed within a year of AEDPA's effective date, and (2) pro se 
prisoner's habeas petition is deemed filed upon delivery to 
prison officials for mailing). 
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IV. 
 
In view of our conclusion that Congress intended the one 
year period of limitation to function as a statute of 
limitation, and thus be subject to equitable tolling, we will 
grant the certificate of appealability, vacate the order of the 
district court dismissing Miller's motion, and remand for 
consideration of the equitable tolling issue. For the 
guidance of the district court, we observe that equitable 
tolling is proper only when the "principles of equity would 
make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair." 
Shendock, 893 F.2d at 1462. Generally, this will occur 
when the petitioner has "in some extraordinary way . . . 
been prevented from asserting his or her rights." Oshiver, 
38 F.3d 1380. The petitioner must show that he or she 
"exercised reasonable diligence in investigating and 
bringing [the] claims." New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 
1126. Mere excusable neglect is not sufficient. See Irwin v. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 
453, 458 (1990); New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1126.1 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The advent of AEDPA has given rise to a considerable number of 
technical legal questions dealing with limitations, of which this case 
presents but one example. In order to provide guidance to the district 
courts, and hence facilitate the orderly administration of justice in 
these 
cases, we have followed the practice, whenever we decide an AEDPA 
issue that arises under S 2254 and the same holding would analytically 
be required in a case arising under S 2255, or vice versa, of so informing 
the district courts. See Burns, 134 F.3d at 112 (holding that resolution 
of issue arising under S 2254 also applies toS 2255 cases); Santana v. 
United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that resolution 
of issue arising under S 2255 also applies toS 2254 cases). We do 
likewise here, and rule that the one year period of limitation for S 2255 
cases is also subject to equitable tolling. 
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